c O M M e n ta rY
Doctors elicit the thoughts and feelings of their patients by taking a medical history. This verbal (and nonverbal) communication with a patient remains central to making a diagnosis and monitor ing symptoms such as pain and distress. We do not yet fully understand what underlying patterns of brain activity encode these conscious experiences. Such an understanding could enable these patterns to be decoded and used to predict perceptions and intentions even without direct communication.
In recent years, there have been considerable advances in the use of noninvasive measures of neural activity to predict perceptions and inten tions in healthy individuals. 1 While somewhat limited in their scope, these early reports raise the intriguing possibility that such approaches might be useful in clinical situations where communi cation with patients is difficult or impossible. As reported in Lancet Neurology, Boly and col leagues 2 have addressed this possibility by study ing brain responses to noxious stimuli in patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS). Their find ings raise intriguing and important ethical and scientific questions concerning pain perception in individuals with severe brain damage.
An MCS is a condition of dramatically altered consciousness in which minimal but definite behavioral evidence of self or environmental awareness is demonstrated. 3 Patients in an MCS SUMMARY There has been much interest in pioneering neuroimaging experiments that study brain responses to sensory stimulation in patients in a minimally conscious or persistent vegetative state. Here, we discuss a recent study by Melanie Boly and her colleagues, in which brain responses to stimulation of the median nerve were measured by use of PET in healthy volunteers and in patients in either a minimally conscious or persistent vegetative state. The stimulation was considered to be painful by the volunteers but did not elicit behavioral responses in either of the two patient groups. Nevertheless, brain activation in patients in a minimally conscious (but not persistent vegetative) state was seen in areas very similar to those activated by the stimuli judged to be painful in healthy volunteers. Here, we discuss whether such data can be used to conclude that individuals with severe brain damage feel pain, and we consider the ethically appropriate clinical response to such important new data.
keywords functional imaging, minimally conscious state, pain, PeT cannot communicate, and behavioral evidence of awareness can be inconsistent and difficult to demonstrate. By use of PET imaging, Boly and col leagues showed that in both patients who are in an MCS and healthy controls, noxious stimulation of the median nerve activated similar regions of the thalamus, primary and secondary somatosensory cortices, and the frontoparietal and anterior cingu late cortex. Activity in these areas-known as the 'pain matrix'-plus coupling between primary sensory areas and frontoparietal association cortex was markedly greater in patients in an MCS than in patients in a persistent vegetative state who show no evidence of self or environmental awareness. Such coupling is hypothesized to be important in mediating awareness. 4 Clinically, can we conclude from these pat terns of brain activity that patients in an MCS feel pain? This question has both scientific and ethical dimensions. From a scientific standpoint, it would be premature to reach such a strong conclusion. The authors observed some dif ferences in the quantity and quality of activation in the pain matrix when comparing patients in an MCS with healthy volunteers. This finding is difficult to interpret, because we do not yet know precisely which areas (and what levels of activity) are necessary and sufficient to elicit pain percep tion in healthy individuals. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the individuals in an MCS had severe brain damage, and could not, therefore, be regarded as being just like healthy controls apart from an inability to report their experiences verbally.
G Rees is a Professor
In Boly et al.'s study, the patients in an MCS did not exhibit behavioral responses to noxious stimuli; in other words, they showed a dissociation between brain activity (present) and behavior (absent). Such dissociations typically prompt quite different conclusions in other types of brain injury. In individuals with parietal neglect, for example, responses to visual stimuli can be identified in regions of the visual cortex that correspond to those activated in healthy volun teers, even though the patients cannot report these stimuli. 5 These similar patterns of brain responses, however, do not necessarily imply that patients with parietal neglect are actually aware of these stimuli. We cannot yet conclude, therefore, that patients in an MCS have an inner mental life that includes the conscious perception of pain. The presence of brain activation is insufficient evidence for the perception of pain unless it can be shown that the same activation cannot occur in the absence of pain. 6 For clinicians, there is the immediate practi cal question of whether or not to assume that patients in an MCS can feel pain, and this takes us into the realm of ethics. It is far from obvious how the interests of patients in an MCS might best be served-ethical questions of withholding or withdrawing artificial life support tend to focus on the patient's complete loss of function and the inability to return the patient to anything like a fulfilling and happy life, rather than on their capacity to feel pain. Pain might, however, be an inevitable-if unintended-byproduct of keeping such patients alive. 7 Nevertheless, few would disagree that steps should be taken to avoid pain, provided that they do not jeopardize otherwise beneficial treatment.
Once the decision has been made to initi ate or continue artificial life support, it would seem intuitively sensible to treat the patient for pain, in case they are able to experience it despite being minimally conscious. This is a somewhat unorthodox application of the 'precautionary principle' , which is used in situations of genuine uncertainty or ambiguity where any harm would be severe or irreversible. 8 Several formulations of this principle exist, but if we choose to accept it, the burden of proof should always be on those claiming that no harm is done-in this case, those arguing that patients in an MCS are unable to feel pain if left untreated. We might tentatively propose that there is now reason to believe that patients in an MCS experience pain to such an extent that the clinical use of analgesics would be considered a moral requirement. There could be questions of financial cost, but as the price of analgesics is small compared with that of artificial life support, we would not expect the additional costs of analgesics to be a pressing concern.
Boly et al. have presented important new evi dence in a challenging area of medical practice. While scientifically falling short of demonstrating that patients in an MCS have firstperson experi ences such as pain, this study should prompt more research in this vitally important area. Moreover, clinicians making practical decisions about how to treat such patients may need to take a cautious approach and use analgesics unless sufficient evi dence accumulates to indicate that such patients do not experience pain. 
